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Abstract: The public must make 
assessments of a range of health-
related issues. However, these as-
sessments require scientific know-
ledge which is often lacking or inef-
fectively utilized by the public. Lay 
people must use whatever cognitive 
resources are at their disposal to 
come to judgement on these issues. 
It will be contended that a group of 
arguments—so-called informal fal-
lacies—are a valuable cognitive re-
source in this regard. These argu-
ments serve as cognitive heuristics 
which facilitate reasoning when 
knowledge is limited or beyond the 
grasp of reasoners. The results of an 
investigation into the use of these 
arguments by the public are report-
ed. 
Résumé: Le public doit faire des 
évaluations d'un éventail de ques-
tions liées à la santé. Cependant, ces 
évaluations nécessitent des connais-
sances scientifiques que souvent le 
public n‟a pas ou utilise mal. Les 
profanes doivent utiliser toutes les 
ressources cognitives qui sont à leur 
disposition pour aboutir à un juge-
ment sur ces questions. Il sera soute-
nu qu'un groupe d'arguments - soi-
disant sophismes non formels - sont 
une ressource cognitive précieuse à 
cet égard. Ces arguments servent 
d‟heuristiques cognitives qui facili-
tent le raisonnement lorsque la con-
naissance est limitée ou au-delà de la 
compréhension des raisonneurs. On 
signale les résultats d'une enquête 
sur l'utilisation de ces arguments par 
le public. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There are few scientific disciplines that demand the engagement 
of the public quite like public health science. None of us are be-
yond the expansive reach of this important health-based science. 
Whether we are making decisions about the safety of the swine 
flu immunization for our children, considering whether to dis-
continue the use of the oral contraceptive pill following con-
cerns about thrombosis or opting to remove beef from our diet 
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due to fears about bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 
public health issues are never far from the daily deliberations of 
the public. To the extent that the public must engage with public 
health problems, it is at least relevant to ask if it is adequately 
equipped to do so. Studies of scientific literacy would tend to 
suggest not. Findings indicate a lack of knowledge of scientific 
facts and method
1
 with little evidence of improvement over time 
and some concern that scientific literacy amongst the public may 
actually be decreasing.
2
 Commentators have described how an 
„attentive‟ segment of the population—less than 20%—has suf-
ficient knowledge of and interest in science to assess issues that 
are characterized by complexity and expert uncertainty.
3
 At the 
same time as the public‟s knowledge of scientific issues appears 
to be compromised, there is a growing demand for the public to 
engage with increasingly complex scientific problems. Many of 
these problems are so complex that they are beyond the current 
knowledge levels of scientists themselves (e.g., climate change). 
Even when scientists do have a good understanding of the pro-
cesses involved in a scientific or public health phenomenon, the-
se processes may be so complex as to be beyond the cognitive 
grasp of the lay person. It emerges that the public is confronted 
                                                 
1
 In the Science and Engineering Indicators 2010 (National Science Board, 
2010: 7-19), for example, it was reported that in 2008 only 47 per cent of US 
males questioned and 60 per cent of US females correctly identified that the 
statement Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria is false. Even less were 
subjects able to answer a question that was designed to test their understand-
ing of the scientific method. In 2008, a mere 37 per cent of males and 39 per 
cent of females understood that the effectiveness of a drug for blood pressure 
could only be tested if a control group, that did not receive the drug, was also 
included in the experimental design. 
2
 In a Technical Report prepared by the American Public Health Association 
(APHA) in 1990, APHA remarked: „It is apparent that the escalation of sci-
entific knowledge has not been paralleled by enhanced public understanding 
of science in the US, at least as measured by testing in schools, or in the 
United Kingdom. Indeed, among US junior and senior high school students, 
comprehension of and achievement in science are below that of two decades 
ago. Most adults in the US, whether they bear responsibility for decisions at 
the governmental, public, or personal level, are inadequately versed in sci-
ence and its methods‟ (APHA, 1990: 748). Between 1992 and 2008, the 
number of correct answers to scientific literacy questions posed to US adults 
varied little, with the mean number of correct responses to nine questions 
exceeding five but never attaining six (National Science Board, 2010: 7-18). 
3
 Doble (1995: 95) attributes this claim to Jon Miller of Northern Illinois 
University. Although the American population is the focus of Miller‟s re-
marks, international comparisons in studies of scientific literacy indicate that 
they could apply with equal validity to populations in other developed coun-
tries (see chapter 7 in Science and Engineering Indicators 2010). 
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with a significant dilemma in attempting to form judgements 
about complex public health problems when its cognitive re-
sources for doing so are limited to a greater or lesser extent. 
 If public health science is to succeed in its mission of pro-
tecting the health of the public, some way must be found 
through this impasse. That way, I argue, lies in a new emphasis 
on the reasoning strategies that the public uses to assess public 
health issues.
4
 These strategies are unlikely to consist in deduc-
tion and induction, as certain knowledge and even inductive 
probabilities are often not available to the public health reasoner 
who must engage in judgement in the absence of knowledge.
5
 It 
is in a context of pervasive uncertainty and lack of knowledge 
that presumptive reasoning strategies come to the fore. These 
strategies are adapted to the uncertain conditions that attend 
public health reasoning.
6
 Specifically, it will be argued that a 
group of these strategies, which philosophers and logicians have 
traditionally characterized as informal fallacies, function as cog-
nitive heuristics that guide reasoners through complex delibera-
tions often in the absence of knowledge. These heuristics are a 
type of cognitive shortcut when full consideration of an issue is 
                                                 
4
 I say “new emphasis” because, of course, reasoning has always been 
viewed as an indicator of scientific literacy (for discussion of work in this 
area, see “Reasoning and Understanding the Scientific Process” in chapter 7 
of the Science and Engineering Indicators 2010). Similarly, reasoning has 
been identified as a key element in effective health communication within 
public health work: “Even if communication processes successfully identify 
where and how to reach vulnerable populations, the messages themselves 
must be compatible with the cultural orientations, information priorities, and 
reasoning strategies of affected populations” (Vaughan and Tinker, 2009: 
S329). Implicit in “new emphasis” is the suggestion that much of this focus 
has not produced beneficial outcomes. It is in an attempt to remedy this situa-
tion that the analysis of the present paper is being undertaken. 
5
 In some cases, this absence of knowledge describes the epistemic situation 
of scientists, such as when scientists did not know if BSE would transmit to 
humans when the disease first emerged in British cattle in 1986. In other cas-
es, this absence of knowledge captures the epistemic situation of the public, 
as when public health issues demand a level of knowledge and understanding 
that exceeds the cognitive grasp of the lay person. Irrespective of its source, a 
lack of knowledge demands a unique set of reasoning strategies that are quite 
unlike the traditionally dominant modes of deductive and inductive reason-
ing. 
6
 This adaptation is due in no small part to the epistemic concept of presump-
tion that lies at the heart of these strategies. I have argued elsewhere that pre-
sumption is a neglected epistemic concept which has transformed the analysis 
of the informal fallacies. Specifically, certain features of presumptions, such 
as their defeasibility, their orientation to action and their low epistemic stand-
ing, have enabled these fallacies to function in a rational capacity at the out-
set of a scientific inquiry. For discussion of these features of presumption, the 
reader is referred to Cummings (2010). 
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beyond the cognitive capacities of a reasoner or when a lack of 
knowledge threatens to undermine judgement. In both scenarios, 
these heuristics permit decision-making and judgement to pro-
ceed in a context where a demand for deduction or induction, 
and certain knowledge or probabilistic theses, would stall rea-
soning from the outset. Two such heuristics—the argument from 
ignorance and the argument from authority—are considered be-
low and in Cummings (2014a). Two further heuristics, namely, 
circular argument and analogical argument, are examined in 
Cummings (2014b, 2014c). The same property is common to all 
these strategies, that is, their guidance of reasoning in adverse 
epistemic conditions. With this property in mind, we proceed to 
examine how ignorance and authority arguments operate in gen-
eral and in a public health context in particular. 
 
 
2.  Heuristics and public health reasoning 
 
The idea that heuristics play a role in reasoning is certainly not 
new. Reasoning heuristics were first systematically studied by 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. In their landmark article 
“Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974: 1124) described a number of heuristics 
that reasoners use in probabilistic reasoning: “Many decisions 
are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain 
events…people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles 
which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.” Although 
Tversky and Kahneman acknowledged that heuristics could be 
useful, they were concerned to emphasise the “severe and sys-
tematic errors” to which heuristics could lead. One such error is 
known as the gambler‟s fallacy, the belief that random processes 
self-correct: “if [a random] sequence has strayed from the popu-
lation proportion, a corrective bias in the other direction is ex-
pected” (Tversky and Kahneman, 2004: 193).  
 By the time heuristics began to receive sustained attention 
in the literature on risk, an altogether more benign view of these 
cognitive operations was beginning to take shape. The emphasis 
now was less on the errors in reasoning to which heuristics 
might lead and more on their facilitative function in dealing with 
complex problems. Some of these problems concerned issues of 
public health significance. Trumbo (2002) and Johnson (2005) 
discussed heuristics in two studies that applied a heuristic-
systematic model to the assessment of risk. These studies re-
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quired subjects to assess risks that were communicated in epi-
demiological information about cancer rates (Trumbo) and 
which were posed by a semi-hypothetical industrial facility 
(Johnson). Johnson (2005: 632) states that  
 
[a]…heuristic-systematic model (HSM) separate[s] sys-
tematic from heuristic information processing. The sys-
tematic approach…is deliberative, attends to detail, 
weighs alternative views, and assesses argument quality 
in judging the validity of persuasive messages. The heu-
ristic approach is alert to cues (e.g., trusted groups‟ eval-
uation of the information) and simple decision rules (if 
encoded in memory, accessible to recall, and deemed re-
liable) justifying quick intuitive judgment. 
 
Wilson et al. (2004) examined heuristic processing in a study of 
how adults assessed risks associated with genetically modified 
food crops. 
 The first attempt to construe the informal fallacies as heu-
ristics was undertaken by Walton (2010). According to Walton, 
many of the informal fallacies can be analyzed in terms of an 
argumentation scheme and corresponding parascheme. The ar-
gumentation scheme is part of a newer (in evolutionary terms) 
cognitive system that is slow, controlled and conscious. The per-
son who reasons according to an argumentation scheme ad-
dresses critical questions that are aimed at exposing logical 
weaknesses in an argument, if such weaknesses exist. A para-
scheme is part of an older cognitive system that is fast and au-
tomatic and uses heuristics to jump to conclusions. These heu-
ristics can result in successful solutions to problems, but may on 
occasion lead to error. Walton demonstrates the use of argumen-
tation schemes and paraschemes in relation to a lack of evidence 
argument (the argumentum ad ignorantiam). The argumentation 
scheme for this fallacy contains critical questions, one of which 
addresses the depth of search of the relevant knowledge base. 
The parascheme represents the structure of the heuristic corre-
sponding to this informal fallacy. This scheme bypasses critical 
questions and takes the reasoner from an ordinary premise of the 
form “A is not known to be true” to the conclusion “A is false” 
(Walton, 2010: 178). 
 So heuristics are not a new phenomenon in the study of 
reasoning or even the study of public health reasoning. But what 
is novel about the approach adopted in this paper is that no-one 
has previously attempted to characterize informal fallacies in 
terms of cognitive heuristics that people employ when they form 
judgements about public health problems. Yet, there is much to 
recommend this approach. For those philosophers and logicians 
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who have subjected the informal fallacies to serious scrutiny, the 
rewards have been plentiful. Quite apart from being examples of 
weak, bad or shoddy reasoning, the informal fallacies have been 
found to be rationally warranted arguments within certain con-
texts of use. A sizeable literature now exists on non-fallacious 
variants of most of the major fallacies.
7
 An altogether smaller 
literature has sought to describe how these fallacies function 
non-fallaciously within the context of important public health 
issues (Cummings, 2002, 2004, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c, 2013, 2014d). What these latter studies have re-
vealed is that these argument forms can sustain reasoning in 
contexts that preclude other modes of reasoning, principally de-
duction and induction. These contexts exhibit pervasive uncer-
tainty of the type commonly encountered at the outset of a scien-
tific inquiry or when deliberations exceed a reasoner‟s available 
cognitive resources. In the sections to follow, we examine the 
features of two such heuristics, the argument from ignorance 
and the argument from authority. The findings of a study that 
examines the conditions under which it is reasonable or rational 
for subjects to accept and reject these argument forms are re-
ported (see Blair (2012) for discussion of reasonableness). This 
study extends empirical research into the fallacies that was re-
cently initiated by van Eemeren et al. (2009) in their experi-
mental studies of pragma-dialectical rules for a critical discus-
sion. As well as making an original contribution to our 
knowledge of public health reasoning, this paper is thus also 
making a contribution to what is a rather small empirical litera-
ture on the informal fallacies. 
 
2.1  Argument from ignorance 
 
The argument from ignorance is a particularly productive rea-
soning strategy in contexts of uncertainty. The argument con-
sists in arguing from a lack of knowledge that P is true (or false) 
                                                 
7
 The work of two fallacy theorists—Douglas Walton and John Woods—has 
been particularly influential in this regard. In a large number of books and 
journal articles, these theorists have described non-fallacious forms of petitio 
principii (begging the question), argumentum ad ignorantiam (the argument 
from ignorance), and argumentum ad baculum (the argument from the stick 
or appeal to force), amongst others (Walton 1985, 1992; Woods 1995, 2004). 
Of course, in emphasizing that there exist non-fallacious variants of the in-
formal fallacies, this is not the same as saying that there are no such things as 
fallacious arguments. For discussion of novel fallacious arguments in the 
context of the BSE problem, the reader is referred to Cummings (2005). 
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to the falsity (or truth) of P (where P is a proposition). Variants 
of the argument involve claims to the effect that there is no evi-
dence or no (scientific) justification that P is true. The argument 
was used extensively by scientists and government ministers 
during the UK‟s BSE crisis, where its use was intended to reas-
sure the public about the safety of beef for human consumption 
(Cummings, 2002, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 
2013, 2014d): 
 
There is no evidence that British beef is unsafe to eat. 
          Therefore, British beef is not unsafe (i.e., is safe) to eat. 
 
The argument from ignorance can be more or less warranted in 
different contexts of use. It is a particularly robust form of rea-
soning when two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the knowledge 
base on a certain topic or question is closed (i.e., there is epis-
temic closure of the base), and (2) the knowledge base has been 
exhaustively searched. Both these conditions were satisfied 
when scientists argued during the BSE epidemic that scrapie 
was not transmissible to humans on the grounds that there was 
no evidence that the disease was transmissible to humans 
(Cummings, 2010). In this case, the knowledge base on scrapie 
was closed. This disease had been endemic in the sheep popula-
tion of Great Britain for some 250 years by the time BSE 
emerged and had also been extensively investigated by British 
scientists since the 1940s. Also, the knowledge base on scrapie 
had been extensively searched. A review of world literature by 
Brown et al. (1987) had established that there was no epidemio-
logical evidence of a link between scrapie in sheep and Creutz-
feldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans.  
 However, when scientists and others argued during the 
BSE crisis that BSE was not transmissible to humans on the 
grounds that there was no evidence that it was transmissible, an 
altogether less warranted argument from ignorance was in play. 
When BSE first emerged in British cattle in 1986, it was simply 
not possible to claim closure for the knowledge base on this dis-
ease. Experimental and other studies of the disease had yet to be 
undertaken. Moreover, BSE was known to be a transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathy (TSE), a group of animal and hu-
man diseases with lengthy incubation periods. To the extent that 
it could take many years before natural transmission of BSE 
might become apparent to investigators, the knowledge base on 
BSE could not be closed in 1986 or indeed for some time to 
come. The extent to which reasoners are able to identify when 
conditions (1) and (2) above are fulfilled in ignorance reasoning 
will be examined in section 3. 
8     Louise Cummings     
 
 
 
© Louise Cummings. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No.1 (2014), pp. 1-37. 
 
 The argument from ignorance is a rationally warranted 
cognitive heuristic not just for scientists dealing with uncertainty 
when confronted with an emerging infectious disease like BSE, 
but also for the non-expert reasoner who must engage in judge-
ment on an issue about which he lacks knowledge. The argu-
ment effectively transforms a negative epistemic situation (i.e., a 
lack of knowledge) into a positive epistemic situation in which a 
proposition has either been confirmed or disconfirmed (Cum-
mings, 2002). It is this capacity to advance reasoning by trans-
forming the absence of knowledge into a productive source of 
new claims (e.g., scrapie is not transmissible to humans) that 
confers heuristic value on this particular argument form (Cum-
mings, 2002, 2010). It is this same capacity that found scientists, 
who investigated the emergence of BSE, using the argument to 
beneficial effect during scientific inquiry into this disease. 
Where a lack of knowledge threatened to stall inquiry, particu-
larly in the early phase of inquiry when little was known about 
BSE, the argument from ignorance enabled scientists to forge 
ahead on an exploratory basis until such times as sufficient evi-
dence became available for deductively warranted conclusions 
to be drawn (Cummings, 2010). The heuristic value of this ar-
gument is not lost on the lay reasoner either, whose cognitive 
deliberations about public health problems are equally vulnera-
ble to limitations resulting from a lack of knowledge of scien-
tific issues. We will see in section 3 if lay reasoners are able to 
identify the conditions under which the argument from igno-
rance is functioning as an effective heuristic in public health 
reasoning. 
 
2.2  Argument from authority 
 
The argument from authority, also known as the argument from 
expertise or argumentum ad verecundiam,
8
 appeals to the expert 
or authority who produces a claim as grounds for the truth of 
that claim.
9
 For this argument to have rational legitimacy, the 
                                                 
8 Although “argumentum ad verecundiam” (literally, the argument from 
modesty) is often used to describe arguments that appeal to authority, Walton 
(1995: 278) remarks that this expression should be used only to refer to falla-
cious appeals to authority.  
9
 Walton (1997: 258) uses the following argumentation scheme for appeals to 
expert opinion, in which A is a proposition, E is an expert and D is a domain 
of knowledge: E is an expert in domain D. 
             E asserts that A is known to be true. 
             A is within D. 
             Therefore, A may (plausibly) be taken to be true. 
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so-called authority must have genuine as opposed to apparent 
expertise in an area (as indicated by professional standing and 
academic or other qualification) and must be motivated by sci-
entific ideals such as objectivity and impartiality. The argument 
from authority is widely used in scientific reasoning in general 
and in public health reasoning in particular (see Cummings 
(2010) for an extensive discussion of the use of this argument 
during the BSE epidemic). It is not difficult to see why this is 
the case. The lay reasoner cannot possibly have knowledge of 
the various scientific disciplines to which public health prob-
lems relate. On the single issue of BSE, knowledge of—amongst 
other areas—human and animal TSEs, veterinary science, neu-
ropathology, and zoonoses (human diseases with origins in low-
er vertebrates) was necessary to assess the implications of BSE 
for human health. No single expert could embody this vast range 
of knowledge, let alone members of the public. The argument 
from authority enables lay reasoners to defer to suitable authori-
ties in forming judgements about public health issues. The heu-
ristic value of this argument consists in the fact that the lay rea-
soner does not need to have direct knowledge of the disciplines 
to which an issue relates.
10
 Rather, he or she merely needs to 
accurately identify those factors that are indicative of genuine, 
impartial expertise, as this particular form of expertise is the ba-
sis of the most rationally warranted authority appeals. We will 
see in section 3 what factors are significant for lay reasoners in 
their assessments of different types of expertise. 
 Commentators have acknowledged the need for authority 
appeals or appeals to expertise in scientific and public health 
contexts. The Science and Engineering Indicators 2010 state that  
 
                                                                                                         
 
10
 In fact, the argument from authority functions by bypassing knowledge of 
disciplines. The lay reasoner is effectively spared the need to engage with 
disciplines, the key feature of which is that they are beyond one‟s grasp on 
account of their complexity. Willard (1990: 11) captures this point as fol-
lows:  
I might prefer the Darwinian to the biblical narrative because I 
have examined the fossil record for myself, worked through the 
details of Darwin‟s argumentation, and followed the debates 
that led up to the present version of the theory; or, failing to 
one degree or another at any or all of these tasks, I prefer the 
Darwinian narrative because I accept the conclusions of ex-
perts. That is, given the numbers and enormity of technical lit-
eratures, and the complexities within them, I accept expert tes-
timony in lieu of inspecting evidence or hearing the arguments 
out (italics in original). 
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[f]or the science-related decisions that citizens face, a 
comprehensive understanding of the relevant scientific 
research would require mastery and evaluation of a great 
deal of evidence. In addition to relying on direct evidence 
from scientific studies, citizens who want to draw on sci-
entific evidence must consult the judgments of leaders 
and other experts whom they believe can speak authorita-
tively about the scientific knowledge that is relevant to an 
issue (National Science Board, 2010: 7-31).  
 
Some investigators have also remarked on the heuristic nature of 
authority appeals. In a study that examined subjects‟ perception 
of cancer rates, Trumbo (2002: 368) stated that “[h]euristic pro-
cessing…occurs when individuals use simple decision rules to 
help them arrive at a judgment about message validity. Such de-
cision rules might manifest themselves as agreement with expert 
opinion or a tendency to agree with consensus” (italics added). 
However, while investigators acknowledge the heuristic value of 
authority appeals, there is rather less clarity on how to examine 
such appeals in actual lay reasoners. Empirical studies have typ-
ically examined expertise as one dimension of trust, a topic on 
which there exists a substantial literature.
11
 One study in particu-
lar confirms the idea that a lack of knowledge is the impetus for 
authority appeals, in that public reliance on trust is shown to be 
related to lack of knowledge of a perceived hazard on the part of 
subjects.
12
 But what this research lacks is any sense of expertise 
in its own right (apart from a wider concept of trust) and how 
this altogether narrower notion shapes the reasoning processes 
                                                 
11
 Discussion of trust in the literature on risk tends to take one of two forms. 
Some investigators identify multiple dimensions to the trust concept. Berry 
(2004: 21) captures this approach when she states that “[r]esearch has shown 
that trust is multifaceted rather than one-dimensional, with relevant factors 
including perceived competence, objectivity, fairness and consistency.” Other 
investigators argue that the different attributes associated with trust can be 
adequately captured within two main dimensions to the concept. This alterna-
tive approach is characterised by Frewer et al. (1996: 474) when they remark 
that “two major dimensions have emerged as being important in determining 
trust—that of „competence‟, the expertise held by the communicator, and the 
extent to which they are able to pass on information about a particular subject 
area and „trustworthiness‟, the degree to which the communicator will be 
truthful in the information communicated.” For discussion of how different 
investigators characterize trust, the reader is referred to Poortinga and Pidg-
eon (2003). 
12
 Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000: 713) state that their “results suggest that 
the lay public relies on social trust when making judgments of risks and ben-
efits when personal knowledge about a hazard is lacking.” 
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to which the public subscribes. This omission will be the focus 
of the authority appeals examined in the next section.     
  
 
3.  A study of two informal fallacies 
 
Rationale 
 
This study is an experimental investigation
13
 of the informal fal-
lacies, a branch of inquiry that has been the exclusive domain to 
date of logic and philosophy. It is also the first attempt to exam-
ine how the public reasons using these argument forms in a pub-
lic health context. The aim of this study is to establish the condi-
tions under which subjects judge arguments from ignorance and 
from authority to be rationally warranted during deliberation on 
public health problems. These problems are characterized by a 
high degree of scientific knowledge which lay reasoners lack 
and which they cannot acquire on account of cognitive and edu-
cational limitations. Both argument forms are thus serving as 
cognitive heuristics that facilitate the public‟s reasoning about 
these problems in the absence of knowledge.  
 The philosophical literature on these fallacies suggests that 
the argument from ignorance is more or less warranted in ac-
cordance with two factors: (1) the closure of the knowledge base 
on a topic or question, and (2) a search of the knowledge base to 
which the topic or question relates. These epistemic features of 
the argument from ignorance are the basis for varying the fol-
lowing conditions in the study: closure (full versus incomplete) 
and search (exhaustive versus limited). If philosophers are cor-
rect about the rational merits of this particular argument form, it 
                                                 
13
 When one thinks of experimental investigations of reasoning, the work of 
cognitive psychologists such as Phillip Johnson-Laird on deductive reasoning 
typically comes to mind. While this study shares certain features with this 
work—the presentation of stimulus material that tests if certain inferences 
have been drawn by subjects—it also differs from this work in significant 
ways. For example, studies of deductive reasoning present information in the 
form of premises in a structured argument to subjects, who are then required 
to draw a conclusion or judge the validity of a presented conclusion. In the 
current study, reasoning is examined in a discursive context with subjects 
asked to justify their assessment of the reasoning of certain scientific actors. 
To this extent, this study is more akin to the experimental reasoning studies 
of David N. Perkins, who has studied how subjects reason about everyday 
issues which are often polemical in nature (e.g., whether or not a military 
draft in the United States would increase American influence in the world). It 
is worth noting that Finocchiaro (1994: 14) has remarked of Perkins‟s ap-
proach that it is “much more valid than the usual experiments and provides 
the only effective experimental means of getting in touch and coming to grips 
with the phenomenon of reasoning.” 
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is to be expected that subjects will accept more ignorance argu-
ments when there is full closure of a knowledge base that has 
been exhaustively searched, and will accept progressively fewer 
of these arguments as the knowledge base approaches an incom-
plete state and has only been searched in a limited way. To con-
trol for the fact that the judgements of subjects will be influ-
enced by their prior beliefs about the topics addressed in the 
scenarios,
14
 an equal number of actual and non-actual situations 
are depicted. The eight scenarios addressed (1) the transmissibil-
ity of scrapie to humans, (2) trials of a new asthma drug, (3) the 
transmissibility of BSE to humans, (4) chemicals in effluent 
from a pharmaceutical plant, (5) the safety of genetically modi-
fied foods, (6) a food additive in dairy products, (7) the swine 
flu immunization, and (8) an outbreak of severe food poisoning. 
The types of ignorance arguments investigated in the study are 
shown in Appendix 1. 
 Philosophical reflection on the argument from authority is 
also the basis for the different types of authority appeals that are 
included in the study. To the extent that authority appeals are 
rationally warranted when the expertise of the authority is genu-
ine as opposed to dubious in nature, and when expertise upholds 
the ideal of scientific objectivity (i.e., is impartial as opposed to 
partial), there is justification for the following conditions in the 
study: expertise (genuine versus dubious) and expertise (partial 
versus impartial). It is to be expected that as authority appeals 
move progressively away from the condition in which expertise 
is genuine and impartial that subjects will be increasingly in-
clined not to accept these appeals (i.e., they will not find them 
valid or warranted). As with ignorance arguments, it is im-
portant to control for the fact that subjects‟ judgements may be 
influenced by prior beliefs that they have about certain public 
health topics or issues. To this end, an equal number of actual 
and non-actual scenarios are included. The eight scenarios used 
to examine authority appeals are (1) pronouncements on BSE by 
the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee, (2) use of 
chemicals in food production, (3) aspirin use and Reye‟s syn-
                                                 
14
 It is expected that background knowledge and beliefs will affect the infor-
mation that subjects attend to in the passages and the significance that sub-
jects attach to this information. As Klahr (2000: 30) remarks: “When people 
are reasoning about real world contexts, their prior knowledge imposes 
strong theoretical biases…. These biases influence not only the initial 
strength with which hypotheses are held—and hence the amount of discon-
firming evidence necessary to refute them—but also the features in the evi-
dence that will be attended to and encoded.”  
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drome, (4) cancer risks posed by a nuclear power facility, (5) 
safety of the measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine, (6) elec-
tromagnetic emissions from mobile phone masts, (7) pro-
nouncements on BSE by the Southwood Working Party, and (8) 
air-borne chemical emissions from a recycling facility. The 
types of authority appeals included in the study are shown in 
Appendix 2. In summary, the two hypotheses to be tested in this 
study can be stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: It is predicted that subjects will assess the ration-
al warrant of the argument from ignorance on the basis of two 
epistemic criteria: (1) closure of a knowledge base and (2) 
search of a knowledge base. It is expected that subjects will 
judge arguments from ignorance that satisfy these criteria to be 
rationally warranted while arguments which fall short of these 
criteria will be judged to be rationally unacceptable. 
 
Hypothesis 2: It is predicted that subjects will assess the ration-
al warrant of the argument from authority on the basis of two 
epistemic criteria that reflect (1) how genuine an authority‟s ex-
pertise is and (2) how impartial an authority‟s expertise is. It is 
expected that subjects will judge arguments from authority that 
satisfy these criteria to be rationally warranted while arguments 
which fall short of these criteria will be judged to be rationally 
unacceptable. 
 
Method 
 
This study is part of a wider investigation of the role in public 
health reasoning of four informal fallacies (ignorance argument, 
authority argument, circular argument and analogical argument). 
Each subject was presented with eight public health scenarios in 
the form of a written, postal questionnaire. There were three dif-
ferent versions of the questionnaire and each respondent com-
pleted only one version. Scenarios examining the four fallacies 
were randomly distributed across the three versions of the ques-
tionnaire. The scenarios consisted of a single paragraph of in-
formation following which were four questions. Two of the 
questions required either a yes/no response or a response of a 
few words, and could be answered on the basis of information 
explicitly presented in the corresponding passage. These ques-
tions were intended to give respondents the impression that they 
were engaging in a reading comprehension task. A third ques-
tion was intended to establish if subjects had derived a particular 
ignorance inference. Depending on the passage, a “yes” or “no” 
response indicated that respondents had derived the target igno-
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rance inference. A response of “don‟t know” indicated that sub-
jects had failed to derive the target inference. A fourth question 
asked subjects to explain their answer to the inference question. 
It was intended to elicit an open response from which infor-
mation could be gleaned about the factors that had been signifi-
cant in the individual subject‟s reasoning. The following passage 
and questions examined an ignorance inference with the features 
<full closure + exhaustive search + actual scenario>: 
 
Scrapie in sheep and BSE in cattle belong to the 
same family of diseases, the transmissible spongi-
form encephalopathies (TSEs). These diseases are 
caused by an unconventional pathogen (an infectious 
protein called a prion) and are invariably fatal in the 
animals and humans that develop them. When BSE 
first emerged in British cattle in 1986, scrapie had 
been present in British sheep for over 250 years. 
Scrapie has been the subject of extensive scientific 
study since the 1940s. Numerous epidemiological 
studies from around the world have investigated if 
there is a link between scrapie and a TSE in humans 
called Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). In 1987, 
Brown and colleagues conducted a review of all the-
se studies and found that there was no evidence that 
scrapie was transmissible to humans.  
 
(1) Is Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease a TSE in humans? 
(2) Is scrapie transmissible to humans?       
                  Yes No Don‟t know 
(3) When did the scientific study of scrapie first begin?  
(4) Please explain your response to (2). 
  
 Authority arguments were assessed using a similar format. 
As with ignorance arguments, four questions followed each pas-
sage. Two of these questions examined information presented in 
the passage and required either a yes/no response or a minimal 
response of just a few words. The question targeting the authori-
ty argument in the passage asked subjects to rate the conclusions 
or pronouncements of an individual scientist, scientific commit-
tee or scientific review panel as valid, moderately valid or not 
valid at all. A fourth question asked subjects to explain their re-
sponse to the authority question. The open-ended nature of the 
response was intended to reveal the types of factors to which 
subjects attached significance in rating an authority argument. 
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The following passage and questions examined an authority ar-
gument with the features <genuine expertise + partial expertise 
+ actual scenario>: 
 
Reye‟s syndrome is a serious illness that can affect 
all organs in the body but most often the brain and 
liver. The condition kills one in three children who 
develop it. In 1980, in response to a number of stud-
ies which revealed that children with chicken pox or 
flu who took aspirin were more likely to develop 
Reye‟s syndrome, the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) in the US issued an alert to the medical 
community. The aspirin industry challenged the 
causal association between aspirin and Reye‟s syn-
drome which had been revealed by the studies and 
which had been the basis of the CDC‟s actions. Sev-
eral pharmaceutical companies that manufacture as-
pirin collaborated on the establishment of a scientific 
review panel to consider all the available evidence in 
relation to aspirin and Reye‟s syndrome. The panel 
consisted of leading American and British experts in 
pharmacoepidemiology, the discipline that studies 
the effects of drugs on populations. The review pan-
el concluded that there was insufficient evidence to 
indicate that aspirin caused Reye‟s syndrome in 
children. Each of the experts on the review panel re-
ceived a consultancy fee from the pharmaceutical 
companies that manufacture aspirin. 
 
(1) Which two organs are most often affected by Reye‟s 
syndrome? 
(2) How do you rate the conclusions reached by the                               
scientific review panel?   
 Valid   Moderately valid  Not valid at all 
(3) Please explain your response to (2). 
(4) Did the review panel contain experts in pharmacoepi-
demiology? 
 
 All responses were written on the questionnaire which was 
completed anonymously. Subjects were informed that the task 
would take approximately 30 minutes to complete and that all 
data and responses were confidential. They were advised to un-
dertake the exercise in a distraction-free environment and not to 
consult sources such as books and the internet, as questions were 
intended to elicit judgements from subjects rather than correct 
answers. A deadline for return of the questionnaire was commu-
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nicated to all subjects. At the outset of the study, all scenarios 
were examined by two public health consultants and two aca-
demic linguists. This was done with a view to establishing, re-
spectively, the plausibility (in public health terms) of the scenar-
ios and the comprehensibility of the linguistic constructions 
used to characterize them. 
 
Subjects 
 
A total of 879 subjects participated in the study. All subjects 
were between 18 and 65 years of age. Subjects could be male or 
female, of any ethnic or socioeconomic background and could 
be educated to either university level or secondary school level. 
The characteristics of all respondents to the questionnaire are 
shown in Appendix 3. The three versions of the questionnaire 
received the same number of respondents: version A (293 sub-
jects), version B (293 subjects), version C (293 subjects). Sub-
jects were recruited to the study through a combination of meth-
ods. For the most part, the participation of subjects was secured 
through a series of formal recruitment activities which were un-
dertaken in several venues, including public areas in local hospi-
tals, staff dining facilities in large retail outlets and the lounge 
areas of private health clubs. A smaller number of subjects were 
recruited through a technique known as snowball sampling. In 
this technique, respondents to the questionnaire either offered to 
provide, or were asked to provide, the contact details of other 
individuals who might be willing to participate in the study. 
Questionnaires were subsequently sent to these individuals, 
some of whom recommended, in turn, other people who could 
participate in the investigation.
15
 Snowball sampling is a particu-
larly effective way of recruiting subjects for a study when target 
groups are known to be inaccessible for a range of reasons 
(Browne, 2005). It was predicted at the outset of the study that 
secondary school educated males would be particularly unwill-
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A sampling procedure may be defined as snowball sampling 
when the researcher accesses informants through contact in-
formation that is provided by other informants. This process is, 
by necessity, repetitive: informants refer the researcher to other 
informants, who are contacted by the researcher and then refer 
her or him to yet other informants, and so on. Hence the evolv-
ing „snowball‟ effect, captured in a metaphor that touches on 
the central quality of this sampling procedure: its accumulative 
(diachronic and dynamic) dimension‟ (Noy, 2008: 330). 
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ing to participate in an investigation of this type.
16
 Despite con-
siderable efforts to recruit these subjects, the final recruitment 
figures revealed that secondary school educated males did in-
deed constitute an underrepresented group in the study: second-
ary school males (87 subjects), secondary school females (203 
subjects), university males (205 subjects), university females 
(384 subjects). 
 
Results 
 
Full results for the argument from ignorance and the argument 
from authority are displayed in Appendices 1 and 2, respective-
ly. Results for both types of argument are presented in this sec-
tion.  
 Acceptance rates for argument from ignorance inferences 
decreased as closure and search conditions were progressively 
manipulated in a negative direction, that is, towards incomplete 
closure and limited search: 71.4% (full closure, exhaustive 
search), 33% (full closure, limited search), 16.6% (incomplete 
closure, exhaustive search), and 10.3% (incomplete closure, lim-
ited search). The rate of inference rejection decreased as closure 
and search conditions were progressively manipulated in a posi-
tive direction, that is, towards full closure and exhaustive search: 
89.7% (incomplete closure, limited search), 83.4% (incomplete 
closure, exhaustive search), 67% (full closure, limited search), 
and 28.6% (full closure, exhaustive search). There was a negli-
gible difference in inference acceptance rates between actual and 
non-actual scenarios under some epistemic conditions such as 
<full closure, exhaustive search>: 71.4% (actual scenario) and 
68.4% (non-actual scenario). Differences were more pronounced 
under other epistemic conditions such as <full closure, limited 
search>: 17.6% (actual scenario) and 33% (non-actual scenario). 
Some of these differences were found to be statistically signifi-
cant and will be addressed in the discussion section. 
 Data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS for Windows Version 18.0). In a number 
of cases, Pearson chi-square values supported initial impressions 
                                                 
16
 Level of formal education is almost certainly a key factor in the poor en-
gagement of secondary school males in this study. However, another factor is 
likely to be the topic of the study. There is evidence that biological and health 
sciences are of less interest to men than the physical sciences. As a health-
related discipline, public health science may simply not engage the interest of 
men sufficiently for them to want to engage in this study. See chapter 7 in the 
Science and Engineering Indicators 2010 (National Science Board, 2010) for 
a detailed discussion of the role of formal education and sex in both interest 
in science and performance in surveys of scientific literacy. 
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of large and potentially significant differences between percent-
age results and, similarly, of small and negligible differences 
between percentage results. In this way, small percentage differ-
ences between the epistemic conditions <full closure, exhaustive 
search, actual scenario> and <full closure, exhaustive search, 
non-actual scenario> were obtained. These included inference 
acceptance rates of 71.4% (actual scenario) and 68.4% (non-
actual scenario), and inference rejection rates of 28.6% (actual 
scenario) and 31.6% (non-actual scenario). These small and neg-
ligible percentage differences were confirmed by a large Pearson 
chi-square value of 58.097. This value exceeds 0.05, indicating 
that there was no significant difference between the <actual> 
and <non-actual> variables examined in these respective pas-
sages. 
 However, there were also some large and, as it emerged, 
statistically significant differences in the inference acceptance 
and rejection rates across the passages that examined the argu-
ment from ignorance. For example, under the epistemic condi-
tions <full closure, exhaustive search, non-actual scenario>, 
68.4% of subjects accepted the ignorance inference while only 
10.3% did so under the epistemic conditions <incomplete clo-
sure, limited search, non-actual scenario>. This large percentage 
difference was statistically significant with a Pearson chi-square 
value of 0.027 indicating that the null hypothesis must be reject-
ed, i.e., the difference between these variables was not the result 
of chance. In total, four statistically significant differences were 
obtained for the argument from ignorance passages. These pas-
sages and their Pearson chi-square values are displayed below: 
 
    Passage comparison Chi-square 
value 
Significance 
 
Incomplete, exhaustive, actual 
compared to 
Full, limited, actual 
 
0.00 
 
< 0.05, significant 
Full, exhaustive, non-actual 
compared to 
Incomplete, limited, non-actual 
 
 
0.027 
 
< 0.05, significant 
Incomplete, limited, actual 
compared to 
Full, limited, non-actual 
 
0.029 
 
< 0.05, significant 
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Incomplete, exhaustive, non-
actual 
compared to 
Incomplete, limited, non-actual 
 
0.022 
 
< 0.05, significant 
Table 1 
      It is worth remarking that two other comparisons of argu-
ment from ignorance passages resulted in chi-square values that 
approached significance. These comparisons were (1) <incom-
plete closure, exhaustive search, non-actual scenario> and <in-
complete closure, limited search, actual scenario> (chi-square 
value = 0.069), and (2) <full closure, limited search, actual sce-
nario> and <incomplete closure, limited search, actual scenario> 
(chi-square value = 0.068). 
 Potentially significant trends were also observed for the 
argument from authority. As expertise was progressively ma-
nipulated in a negative direction, that is, towards expertise that 
was increasingly dubious and partial in nature, the percentage of 
respondents who rated authority inferences as valid steadily de-
clined: 65.7% (genuine, impartial expertise), 21.5% (dubious, 
impartial expertise), 12.1% (genuine, partial expertise), and 
3.4% (dubious, partial expertise). As expertise was progressive-
ly manipulated in a positive direction, that is, towards expertise 
that was increasingly genuine and impartial in nature, the per-
centage of respondents who rated authority inferences as not 
valid at all steadily declined: 69.6% (dubious, partial expertise), 
62% (genuine, partial expertise), 24% (dubious, impartial exper-
tise), and 6.3% (genuine, impartial expertise). There was a neg-
ligible difference in the percentage of respondents who rated 
authority inferences as valid under some epistemic conditions 
such as <dubious, partial expertise>: 3.8% (actual scenario) and 
3.4% (non-actual scenario). Differences were more marked un-
der other epistemic conditions such as <dubious, impartial ex-
pertise>: 21.5% (actual scenario) and 6.2% (non-actual scenar-
io). Some of these differences were statistically significant and 
will be addressed in the discussion section. 
 Statistical analysis also confirmed initial impressions of 
small and negligible differences in subject responses to some 
authority passages, and larger and potentially significant differ-
ences in responses to other authority passages. In this way, there 
were negligible differences in the percentage of subjects who 
rated authority inferences as valid and not valid at all under the 
conditions <genuine, impartial expertise, actual scenario> and 
<genuine, impartial expertise, non-actual scenario>. For exam-
ple, the percentage of subjects who rated passages under these 
conditions as valid was 65.7% (actual scenario) and 57.1% (non-
actual scenario), while the percentage who rated these passages 
as not valid at all was 6.3% (actual scenario) and 9.9% (non-
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actual scenario). Statistical analysis confirmed that these small 
percentage differences were non-significant. A Pearson chi-
square value of 15.694 for these passages exceeds 0.05, indicat-
ing that there was no significant difference in the <actual> and 
<non-actual> variables, at least as examined under the epistemic 
conditions <genuine, impartial expertise>.  
 However, there were also some large and, as it emerged, 
statistically significant differences in subjects‟ validity ratings 
across the passages that examined the argument from authority. 
For example, under the epistemic conditions <genuine, partial 
expertise; actual scenario>, only 38% of subjects rated the infer-
ence as either valid or moderately valid while 64.1% did so un-
der the epistemic conditions <genuine, partial expertise; non-
actual scenario>. This large percentage difference was statisti-
cally significant with a Pearson chi-square value of 0.012 indi-
cating that the null hypothesis must be rejected, i.e., the differ-
ence between these variables was not the result of chance. In 
total, three statistically significant differences were obtained for 
the argument from authority passages. These passages and their 
Pearson chi-square values are displayed below:  
 
      Passage comparison Chi-square 
Value 
Significance 
 
Genuine, partial, actual 
compared to 
Genuine, partial, non-actual 
 
0.012 
 
< 0.05, significant 
Genuine, impartial, actual 
compared to 
Dubious, impartial, non-actual 
 
0.042 
 
< 0.05, significant 
Genuine, impartial, actual 
compared to 
Genuine, partial, non-actual 
 
 
0.049 
 
< 0.05, significant 
Table 2 
 
 It is worth remarking that one other argument from author-
ity passage comparison resulted in a chi-square value that ap-
proached significance. This comparison was <genuine, partial 
expertise; actual scenario> and <dubious, partial expertise; actu-
al scenario> (chi-square value = 0.060). 
 A subset of data underwent statistical analysis using the 
Pearson chi-square test in order to establish if there were any 
effects of respondents‟ gender and education level on reasoning. 
No significant differences were found on any of the passages in 
accordance with the gender and education level of respondents. 
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This confirms in part a finding of Trumbo (2002) that the age 
and gender of participants did not have any effect on the type of 
information processing (systematic versus heuristic) that was 
used during the assessment of epidemiological information 
about cancer rates. Given this lack of significant differences, and 
the fact that attributes such as the age, gender and education lev-
el of subjects are not central to the questions investigated in this 
study, it was decided not to pursue further statistical analysis of 
these variables. 
 
Discussion 
 
This study contributes to empirical research in argumentation 
theory. Like the experimental studies of Van Eemeren et al. 
(2009), which reveal that people are able to judge the reasona-
bleness of pragma-dialectical discussion rules, this investigation 
demonstrates that subjects are sensitive to the epistemic and log-
ical conditions under which arguments from ignorance and au-
thority are rationally warranted. Moreover, subjects‟ knowledge 
of these conditions comes into effect during reasoning about 
complex public health issues. A key feature of these issues is 
that lay people must form judgements about them in the absence 
of scientific knowledge and understanding. In terms of the ar-
gument from ignorance, subjects viewed these arguments as 
having greater rational warrant as epistemic conditions steadily 
approached the full closure and exhaustive search of a 
knowledge base. Conversely, subjects viewed these arguments 
as having less rational warrant as epistemic conditions steadily 
approached a state in which there was incomplete closure and a 
limited search of a knowledge base. These clear trends in the 
judgements of subjects are illustrated below, with figures indi-
cating inference acceptance for the argument from ignorance 
(the <actual/non-actual> variable is omitted): 
 
  maximum          
(1) Full closure, exhaustive search: 68.4% ac-
cept inference  
Rational         (2) Full closure, limited search: 33% accept in-
        ference 
Warrant      (3) Incomplete closure, exhaustive search:  
    16.6% accept inference 
(4) Incomplete closure, limited search: 10.3%         
accept inference 
   minimum 
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 Furthermore, these trends in subjects‟ judgements were 
supported by significant Pearson chi-square results, which indi-
cate that differences in the response rates of subjects cannot be 
attributed to chance. Not only was there a significant difference 
in subjects‟ responses to passages representing conditions (1) 
and (4)—a finding which would be expected given the very dif-
ferent epistemic conditions contained in these passages—but 
there were also significant differences in responses to passages 
representing the conditions in (2) and (3), and (3) and (4). These 
latter findings suggest that subjects are able to recognize fine-
grained, subtle distinctions in epistemic conditions as well as the 
more pronounced epistemic and logical distinctions represented 
by the conditions in (1) and (4). 
 That subjects are sensitive to the logical and epistemic 
conditions under which the argument from ignorance is rational-
ly warranted, is also suggested by a qualitative analysis of their 
extended responses in the questionnaires. Among responses 
which justify the acceptance of an inference in the conditions 
represented in (1) above were comments relating to the extent of 
the closure and search of a knowledge base. For example, sub-
jects tended towards inference acceptance when scientists were 
represented as conducting extensive tests in an area (full closure 
of a knowledge base) and as reviewing all the evidence in an 
area (exhaustive search of a knowledge base): 
 
Full closure: 
clinical trials have been „extensive‟ on a wide range of 
human subjects […] would give a reasonable result 
(White male, 30 years old, university educated) 
 
seems to have undergone extensive trials and tests (White 
female, 64 years old, secondary school educated) 
 
Exhaustive search: 
it has been reviewed by a panel of experts who have 
found it is not unsafe (White female, 31 years old, uni-
versity educated) 
 
 Subjects were equally clear about the conditions which led 
them to reject the conclusions of arguments from ignorance. In 
this way, when considering passages which represented the epis-
temic conditions in (4) above, subjects made reference to specif-
ic factors which precluded the complete closure and exhaustive 
search of a knowledge base in an area. Such factors may be the 
lengthy incubation period of a disease like BSE or insufficient 
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tests on a chemical, both of which appeared to preclude the clo-
sure of a knowledge base for subjects. Subjects were similarly 
disinclined to accept ignorance inferences when scientists pro-
duced statements about risk in the absence of a full scientific 
review of the evidence (that is, when there was a limited search 
of the knowledge base): 
   
Incomplete closure:    
if the incubation period is so long it is impossible to 
know either way at this stage (White female, 31 years 
old, university educated) 
 
There have not been enough tests done to decide whether 
or not the “said” chemical is carcinogenic (White male, 
50 years old, secondary school educated) 
 
Limited search: 
the scientist claimed there was no evidence to suggest a 
link between the chemical and cancer. Here it would be 
necessary to look at literature or actual laboratory tests to 
confirm whether it is carcinogenic or not (Pakistani Asian 
female, 26 years old, university educated)  
 
 Subjects were equally adept at recognizing the epistemic 
conditions under which arguments from authority are more or 
less rationally warranted. As conditions increasingly approached 
a situation in which expertise was judged to be genuine and im-
partial in nature, the number of subjects who rated authority in-
ferences as valid steadily increased. As conditions approached a 
situation in which expertise was judged to be dubious and partial 
in nature, the number of subjects who rated authority inferences 
as valid or moderately valid steadily decreased. These trends in 
the responses of subjects can be seen below, with the figures in-
dicating the percentage of subjects who rated authority infer-
ences as valid or moderately valid under each set of epistemic 
conditions (the <actual/non-actual> variable has been omitted): 
 
  maximum 
(1) Genuine, impartial expertise:                  
93.7% valid/moderately valid 
Rational        (2) Genuine, partial expertise:  
      64.1% valid/moderately valid 
Warrant      (3) Dubious, impartial expertise:  
      48.1% valid/moderately valid 
(4) Dubious, partial expertise:  
     30.4% valid/moderately valid 
  minimum 
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 These trends were further supported by significant Pearson 
chi-square values. Subjects displayed an ability to distinguish 
between conditions in which scientific authorities displayed 
genuine as opposed to dubious expertise, with a significant chi-
square value obtained for a comparison between two passages 
that represent the epistemic conditions in (1) and (3) above. 
However, subjects were equally adept at distinguishing between 
partial and impartial expertise on the part of scientists. This is 
confirmed by a significant chi-square value for a comparison 
between two passages that represent the epistemic conditions in 
(1) and (2) above.  
 Unlike the argument from ignorance, a significant chi-
square value was also obtained for two argument from authority 
passages which differed in the <actual/non-actual> variable. 
These passages examined the development of Reye‟s syndrome 
in children as a result of taking aspirin (actual scenario) and a 
possible link between the development of a cancer called multi-
ple myeloma and residency in the vicinity of a nuclear facility. 
Subjects were significantly less likely to rate the pronounce-
ments of scientists as valid or moderately valid in the case of 
Reye‟s syndrome than they were in the case of the nuclear pow-
er facility. One possible explanation of this finding is that sub-
jects operate with a higher standard of rational warrant—that is, 
they are less likely to accept scientific verdicts as valid—when 
there is a perceived health risk to children (Reye‟s syndrome) as 
opposed to “local residents,” the latter including adults as well 
(nuclear power facility). An alternative explanation could be that 
the (almost exclusively) British subjects in this study were more 
likely to rate the verdicts of British scientists in the nuclear 
power facility scenario as being valid or moderately valid than 
they were the verdicts of American scientists in the Reye‟s syn-
drome scenario. This could reflect an increased level of trust in 
British scientists by British subjects. Whatever factor or factors 
were influential in subjects‟ ratings of scientific authorities in 
these particular scenarios, it is further evidence that background 
knowledge and beliefs play a significant role in the reasoning of 
subjects. 
 A qualitative analysis of the extended responses that sub-
jects advanced in justification of their validity ratings revealed a 
number of “markers” of genuine expertise. These markers in-
cluded the extensive knowledge and learning of scientists, their 
academic and professional qualifications, affiliation with repu-
table British or American universities, extensive experience in a 
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scientific field, an outstanding record of publication in interna-
tional journals and a high professional standing among col-
leagues in a field. There was an equally rich array of markers of 
scientific impartiality among the subjects‟ responses. They in-
cluded freedom from political interference (e.g., politicians, pol-
icy makers), independence of commercial groups (e.g., farming 
industry, pharmaceutical companies) and independent, transpar-
ent funding of scientific research. Several of these issues are re-
flected in the comments from subjects which are presented be-
low: 
 
Genuine expertise: 
They are experts providing a professional opinion within 
an area that they have knowledge and understanding of 
(White male, 35 years old, university educated) 
 
The experts were leading figures in their fields of special-
isation (White female, 41 years old, university educated) 
 
The fact of previous BNF [British Nuclear Fuels] funding 
for all the scientists might cause sceptical eyebrows to be 
raised, but the national/international standing of the sci-
entists concerned should mean that the report was a rea-
sonable (valid) one in the light of the evidence available 
(White male, 62 years old, university educated) 
 
Impartial expertise: 
the experts were from academic institutes so independent 
from policy makers (White male, 25 years old, university 
educated) 
 
The scientists were independent experts in no way linked 
to the food industry. There would be no bias to influence 
their assessment of safety (White female, 59 years old, 
university educated) 
 
 Even as subjects rated the opinions of scientists as valid or 
moderately valid, many sounded notes of caution and criticism. 
For example, a number of subjects went against the grain in de-
scribing a lack of industry funding as leading to poorer science 
and research through the loss of „real‟ experts in a field. Other 
subjects drilled down into the expertise of individual scientists, 
challenging the scope and relevance of a particular scientist‟s 
expertise: 
 
Cautionary and critical comments: 
It‟s difficult to know how valid it is. For one thing scien-
tists who received funding from the food industry/acted 
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as consultants were not permitted to sit on the body. But 
this could have been a negative as they might have had 
the best advice and expertise on the subject (White fe-
male, 37 years old, university educated) 
 
Leading experts and independent figures, but I‟d want 
further details on the expertise of those involved—
Almond [a scientist named in the passage] ticks the “vi-
rology” and “immunology” boxes, but his school sug-
gests his expertise may relate to animals, rather than hu-
mans (White female, 32 years old, university educated) 
 
Some of the most stridently expressed comments in the 
questionnaires were made in relation to passages that threw into 
doubt the expertise of scientists. There were numerous markers 
of dubious expertise amongst subjects‟ responses. They included 
a lack of knowledge, training and specialisation on the part of 
scientists, the use of methodologically questionable techniques 
and procedures in scientific research and concerns about the 
scope and relevance of a scientist‟s expertise: 
 
Dubious expertise: 
I don‟t feel that he would be knowledgeable enough 
about diseases when his area of specialism is surgery 
(White female, 31 years old, university educated) 
 
His speciality is surgery and transplants. Where is con-
nection to MMR [measles, mumps, rubella vaccination]? 
(Indian Asian female, 32 years old, university educated) 
 
He only conducted tests on 12 children—a very low 
number. Surely he could not make valid claims based on 
such a low number of cases? (White female, 37 years old, 
university educated) 
 
 Subjects were particularly forthright in expressing when 
they believed scientists‟ opinions were partial in some respect. 
Markers of partial expertise included comments to the effect that 
scientists were “in the pockets” or “on the payroll” of pharma-
ceutical companies and that they were “industry stooges.” These 
commercial interests were characterized as compromising the 
objectivity of scientific research, with scientific judgements de-
scribed as being „swayed‟ or otherwise tainted by the fees scien-
tists received for their work: 
 
Partial expertise: 
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The experts were on the payroll of the pharmaceutical 
companies…that is not ethical and de-legitimises the 
work done (White and Asian male, 28 years old, universi-
ty educated) 
 
Were they in the pockets of the pharmaceutical compa-
nies? (White female, 64 years old, secondary school edu-
cated) 
 
there are obviously questions of bias here and whether 
the scientists were in effect industry stooges (White male, 
46 years old, university educated) 
 
Would their conclusions have been swayed by the fact 
too that they were receiving a consultancy fee from the 
pharmaceutical companies that manufacture aspirin? 
(White female, 41 years old, university educated) 
 
These combined findings reveal a somewhat unexplored, 
and certainly untested, rational competence on the part of lay 
people during reasoning about complex scientific issues of the 
type encountered in public health. In the absence of scientific 
knowledge, lay people must find some means of coming to 
judgement about public health problems. Suspension of judge-
ment certainly avoids the risk of error. But a policy of cognitive 
inaction presents other, potentially serious risks, when the con-
sequence of this inaction is that protective public health 
measures are ignored or shunned. When lay people are con-
fronted with gaps in their knowledge, arguments of the type in-
vestigated in this study function as quick „rules of thumb‟ or, 
more formally, cognitive heuristics for bridging these gaps. It is 
under conditions of uncertainty that arguments from ignorance 
and authority leave their historical (and largely unfavourable) 
baggage behind and display their true value as effective strate-
gies for charting a course to judgement in the absence of scien-
tific knowledge. The fact that subjects appear to be so adept at 
recognizing the conditions under which these arguments are 
more or less rationally warranted is a reasonably strong basis for 
the conclusion that the epistemic distinctions explored in this 
study have psychological reality for lay people. At least this 
much is suggested by the findings of this experimental investi-
gation of the informal fallacies. 
 The question arises of how these findings relate to theoret-
ical frameworks of heuristic processing. Although such frame-
works exist in public health—see studies of heuristic processing 
in risk assessment by Trumbo (2002) and Johnson (2005) in sec-
tion 2—none are able to capture the specific emphasis on infor-
mal fallacies in the approach examined in this paper. Recent 
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work by Walton (2010) does, however, examine the relationship 
between informal fallacies and heuristics. Walton‟s characteriza-
tion of the informal fallacies as heuristics was introduced briefly 
in section 2. His framework has a number of merits in terms of 
the approach to the fallacies taken in this paper. It is an explicit 
attempt to characterize the fallacies in cognitive terms. A cogni-
tive approach to fallacy analysis has been woefully lacking in 
the informal logic and argumentation literature.
17
 Yet, such a 
cognitive reorientation of the fallacies seems to be a sine qua 
non of any account of the fallacies which construes them in 
terms of cognitive heuristics in public health reasoning. A fur-
ther merit of Walton‟s approach is that it retains a strong norma-
tive character, notwithstanding its cognitive orientation. In this 
way, heuristics corresponding to informal fallacies are rationally 
(un)warranted given the rational standing of certain assumptions 
and exceptions (the latter form the “critical questions” of the as-
sociated argumentation scheme): “To judge whether an alleged 
argument from ignorance is fallacious the heuristic has to be ex-
amined in relation to whether other assumptions and exceptions 
need to be taken into account that may be acceptable or not” 
(Walton, 2010: 178).  
 Yet, certain drawbacks also attend Walton‟s framework. 
One drawback is that a number of informal fallacies, which have 
been shown to function as rationally warranted heuristics in cer-
tain contexts of use (Cummings, 2010), are not amenable to the 
type of analysis proposed by Walton. Petitio principii or begging 
the question is among several fallacies which “do not appear to 
fit specific argumentation schemes, or benefit directly from 
schemes when it comes to analyzing them” (Walton, 2010: 175). 
Also, Walton conceives of heuristic reasoning in terms of the 
bypassing of critical questions which have the potential to reveal 
logical flaws in argument. However, on the view of fallacies as 
heuristics discussed in this paper, heuristics are not portrayed as 
the failure to address certain critical questions. Indeed, there was 
evidence in this study that subjects do pose and respond to these 
very questions. Rather, heuristics are characterized in terms of 
mental shortcuts through expert knowledge domains which lie 
beyond the cognitive grasp of the lay person. Heuristics on this 
                                                 
17
 With the exception of Hample (1982, 1985, 1988), few other argumenta-
tion and fallacy theorists have attempted to set fallacies within a cognitive 
framework. One prominent fallacy theorist, John Woods, acknowledges the 
paucity of work in this area when he states that “an account of fallacies needs 
to be set in a more general theory of cognitive agency” (2004: xxvi). 
 
Informal Fallacies in Public Health Reasoning       29 
 
 
© Louise Cummings. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No.1 (2014), pp. 1-37. 
conception are bypassing subject knowledge, not the critical 
questions that attend argumentation schemes à la Walton. It re-
mains to be seen if Walton‟s framework can accommodate these 
critical observations (and a few others discussed in Cummings 
(2012a)). In the meantime, his account provides a sound starting 
point for further theoretical exploration of the heuristic function 
of certain informal fallacies.    
 Of course, as well as theoretical implications, the findings 
in this study have implications for how public health workers 
engage with the public. To the extent that subjects have been 
shown to display a rational competence in the assessment of the 
epistemic and logical conditions under which arguments from 
ignorance and authority are rationally warranted, these condi-
tions may be usefully manipulated by public health practitioners 
as they attempt to persuade the public to comply with important 
public health measures. From compliance with control measures 
to limit the spread of infectious diseases to judgements about the 
risks and benefits of vaccinations and other medications, the 
public must be given information that is both comprehensible 
and rationally compelling if people are to cooperate with public 
health initiatives and programs. The responses of subjects to the 
arguments investigated in this study indicate that at least some 
of the so-called informal fallacies may actually be valuable in-
struments within the communication tool-kit of public health 
practitioners.  
 However, another lesson for public health practitioners 
contained in this study is that public health interventions should 
not attempt to bypass the types of rational strategies that this 
study has shown people to be capable of using. This study has 
demonstrated how people use arguments from ignorance and 
authority as quick „rules of thumb‟ or heuristics which guide the 
judgements they make in conditions of uncertainty (the latter 
principally on account of a lack of knowledge or expertise). It 
would be a grave mistake on the part of public health practition-
ers to confuse a lack of scientific knowledge on the part of lay 
people with a lack of rational competence. While lay reasoners 
may exhibit a lack of scientific knowledge, this study has shown 
that they are still very much capable of exercising a rational 
competence when assessing public health issues. As well as pos-
itively exploiting this competence to gain people‟s compliance 
with public health interventions, public health practitioners 
should be very wary indeed of attempts to circumvent it. Any 
public health practitioner who overlooks this rational compe-
tence can expect non-compliance with whatever initiatives and 
programs are presented to the public. 
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4.  Summary 
 
This study is the first experimental investigation to be undertak-
en of a group of arguments known as the informal fallacies in a 
public health context. Specifically, this paper reports the results 
for two such arguments—the argument from ignorance and the 
argument from authority—which are part of a larger investiga-
tion of the rational strategies used by members of the public dur-
ing reasoning about public health issues. By varying the epis-
temic and logical conditions under which these arguments are 
rationally warranted, it has been possible to demonstrate that lay 
people make active use of these argument forms as quick „rules 
of thumb‟ or heuristics in their reasoning. This is done with the 
express purpose of bridging gaps in their scientific knowledge. 
As well as considering the theoretical implications of this study 
for models of heuristic reasoning based on informal fallacies, 
the paper concludes with some remarks about the potential ap-
plications of this investigation to work in public health.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Argument from ignorance 
 
Closure 
 
        Search 
Full Closure Incomplete 
Closure 
 
 
 
  
 
     
 
     
Exhaustive 
Search 
Full closure 
Exhaustive search 
Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Accept inference: 71.4%  
Reject inference (DK): 22.4% 
Reject inference (other): 6.2%  
 
Incomplete closure 
Exhaustive search 
Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Accept inference: 25.3%  
Reject inference (DK): 64.9% 
Reject inference (other): 9.8%  
Full closure 
Exhaustive search 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Accept inference: 68.4% 
Reject inference (DK): 29.6% 
Reject inference (other): 2.0%  
 
Incomplete closure 
Exhaustive search 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Accept inference: 16.6%  
Reject inference (DK): 83.4%  
Reject inference (other): 0% 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Limited  
Search 
Full closure 
Limited search 
Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Accept inference: 17.6%  
Reject inference (DK): 80.3%  
Reject inference (other): 2.1% 
 
Incomplete closure 
Limited search 
Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Accept inference: 20.0% 
Reject inference (DK): 52.4% 
Reject inference (other): 
27.6%  
Full closure 
Limited search 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Results:  
Accept inference: 33.0% 
Reject inference (DK): 65.6% 
Reject inference (other): 1.4% 
 
Incomplete closure 
Limited search 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Accept inference: 10.3% 
Reject inference (DK): 88.0% 
Reject inference (other): 1.7% 
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Appendix 2: Argument from authority 
 
Expertise (1) 
 
     
        Expertise 
(2) 
 
Genuine Expertise 
 
Dubious Expertise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impartial 
Expertise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genuine, impartial expertise 
Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 65.7% 
Moderately valid: 28.0% 
Not valid at all: 6.3% 
Dubious, impartial exper-
tise 
Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 21.5% 
Moderately valid: 54.5% 
Not valid at all: 24.0% 
Genuine, impartial expertise 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 57.1% 
Moderately valid: 33.0% 
Not valid at all: 9.9% 
Dubious, impartial exper-
tise 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 6.2% 
Moderately valid: 41.9% 
Not valid at all: 51.9% 
 
 
 
    
       
 
Partial 
Expertise 
Genuine, partial expertise 
Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 4.2% 
Moderately valid: 33.8% 
Not valid at all: 62.0% 
Dubious, partial expertise 
Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 3.8% 
Moderately valid: 26.6% 
Not valid at all: 69.6% 
Genuine, partial expertise 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 12.1% 
Moderately valid: 52.0% 
Not valid at all: 35.9% 
 
Dubious, partial expertise 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 3.4% 
Moderately valid: 37.0% 
Not valid at all: 59.6% 
 
 
Appendix 3: Subject characteristics 
 
Subject Characteristics 
(total = 879 subjects) 
Age Average: 43.8 years 
Range: 18-65 years 
Gender Male: 292  
Female: 587  
Education 
 
University level: 589  
Secondary school level: 290  
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Subject Characteristics (cont‟d) 
(total = 879 subjects) 
Ethnicity White British: 789  
White Irish: 30  
Asian or British Asian Indian: 15  
Asian or British Asian Pakistani: 4  
Black or Black British Caribbean: 3  
Black or Black British African: 3  
Mixed: White and Black Caribbean: 1 
Mixed: White and Black African: 1  
Mixed: White and Asian: 1  
Other: 32   
                          
 
Appendix 4: Argument type: sex and education level 
(university/secondary) 
 
 
Argument Type 
 
Response 
Sex Education 
M/F Uni/Sec 
Arg. from ignorance: 
Full closure; exhaustive  
search  
Actual scenario 
Accept inference: 
Reject inference  
(DK): 
Other: 
69.1/79.5% 
 
23.8/16.2% 
7.1/4.3% 
71.4/71.4% 
 
24.6/17.6% 
4.0/11.0% 
Arg. from ignorance: 
Full closure; exhaustive  
search 
Non-actual scenario 
Accept inference: 
Reject inference 
(DK): 
Other: 
60.7/71.5% 
 
36.9/26.6% 
2.4/1.9% 
64.5/76.9% 
 
33.5/20.9% 
2.0/2.2% 
Arg. from ignorance: 
Incomplete closure; limited  
search 
Actual scenario 
Accept inference: 
Reject inference 
(DK): 
Other: 
16.7/21.4% 
 
51.2/52.9% 
32.1/25.7% 
19.0/22.2% 
 
56.5/43.3% 
24.5/34.5% 
Arg. from ignorance: 
Incomplete closure; limited  
search 
Non-actual scenario 
Accept inference: 
Reject inference 
(DK): 
Other: 
10.4/10.3% 
 
87.0/88.6% 
2.6/1.1% 
10.0/11.0% 
 
90.0/84.0% 
0/5.0% 
Arg. from ignorance: 
Full closure; limited search 
Actual scenario 
Accept inference: 
Reject inference 
(DK): 
Other: 
23.4/13.6% 
 
74.0/84.7% 
2.6/1.7% 
13.0/26.3% 
 
86.5/68.7% 
0.5/5.0% 
Arg. from ignorance: 
Full closure; limited search 
Non-actual scenario 
Accept inference: 
Reject inference 
(DK): 
Other: 
42.1/27.1% 
 
57.9/70.6% 
0/2.3% 
27.2/44.0% 
 
72.3/53.0% 
0.5/3.0% 
Arg. from ignorance: 
Incomplete closure;  
exhaustive search 
Actual scenario 
Accept inference: 
Reject inference 
(DK): 
Other: 
19.4/27.9% 
74.2/60.7% 
6.4/11.4% 
22.3/31.0% 
68.5/57.7% 
9.2/11.3% 
Arg. from ignorance: 
Incomplete closure;  
exhaustive search  
Non-actual  scenario 
Accept inference: 
Reject inference 
(DK): 
Other: 
10.8/19.6% 
 
89.2/80.4% 
0/0% 
11.7/27.0% 
 
88.3/73.0% 
0/0% 
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Argument Type 
 
 
Response 
Sex 
 
Education 
M/F 
 
Uni/Sec 
Arg. from authority: 
Genuine, impartial  
expertise 
Actual scenario 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
62.2/67.2% 
28.0/27.9% 
9.8/4.9% 
63.5/71.1% 
29.4/24.5% 
7.1/4.4% 
Arg. from authority: 
Genuine, impartial  
expertise 
Non-actual scenario 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
48.8/60.2% 
42.7/28.9% 
8.5/10.9% 
57.1/56.3% 
34.7/28.7% 
8.2/15.0% 
 
Arg. from authority: 
Genuine, partial expertise 
Actual scenario 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
 
3.6/4.4% 
41.0/30.6% 
55.4/65.0% 
 
3.1/6.6% 
31.8/37.4% 
65.1/56.0% 
 
Arg. from authority: 
Genuine, partial expertise 
Non-actual scenario 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
14.0/10.8% 
54.4/50.6% 
31.6/38.6% 
10.5/15.0% 
50.5/55.0% 
39.0/30.0% 
Arg. from authority: 
Dubious, partial expertise 
Actual scenario 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
6.3/2.3% 
23.2/28.7% 
70.5/69.0% 
1.1/9.1% 
20.9/37.4% 
78.0/53.5% 
Arg. from authority: 
Dubious, partial expertise 
Non-actual scenario 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
7.7/1.5% 
37.4/36.8% 
54.9/61.7% 
1.6/7.0% 
37.3/36.4% 
61.1/56.6% 
Arg. from authority: 
Dubious, impartial  
expertise 
Actual scenario 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
20.0/22.3% 
55.6/54.3% 
24.4/23.4% 
24.0/16.9% 
54.7/54.7% 
21.3/28.4% 
Arg. from authority: 
Dubious, impartial  
expertise 
Non-actual scenario 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
11.1/4.0% 
33.3/45.7% 
55.6/50.3% 
6.2/6.3% 
42.3/41.1% 
51.5/52.6% 
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